An exam pattern is a delivery system for cues. Each specific detail — a state of incorporation, a corporate suffix, a dollar figure, the town where something was bought — is there to make you run a particular test. The skill is not knowing the tests. It is seeing which words start which one, and then writing the sentence that shows it.
Read it cold first, with the marks off. Then turn them on and see how much you had already found.
A fact pattern is not prose with law hidden in it. It is a list of cues, each one placed to make you run a particular test, written as a story so that finding them is the work. Three habits do most of the job.
Thirty-two cues from the pattern above. The middle column is the doctrine and the actual test; the last column is the sentence to put on the page, because knowing the test and writing it are separate skills and only one of them gets marked.
“Incorporated in Nevada… officers direct and coordinate from Austin, Texas”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestCorporate citizenship. § 1332(c)(1): a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its principal place of business. PPB is the nerve center — where officers direct, control and coordinate — not where the most activity happens. Hertz Corp. v. Friend (2010)
What to writeEmberline is a citizen of Nevada and Texas. Under Hertz the principal place of business is the nerve center, which the facts place in Austin, so incorporation in Nevada does not make Nevada the only home state.
“HomeStack LLC, organized under Delaware law, main office in Columbus”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestUnincorporated entity citizenship. An LLC takes the citizenship of every member, traced through entity members to natural persons. The state of organization and the head-office state are both irrelevant. Carden v. Arkoma Associates; Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra (2016)
What to writeHomeStack is an LLC, so § 1332(c)(1) does not apply to it. Its citizenship is that of each member. Delaware organization and the Ohio office are distractors: on these facts it is a citizen of at least Ohio and Illinois.
“A third member… whose own membership the filings do not disclose”Subject-matter jurisdictionSilence
TestSilence, and the burden. The party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish it. Tracing stops only at natural persons.
What to writeComplete diversity cannot be confirmed on these facts. Before filing I would trace the holding company’s membership; a single Rhode Island member defeats diversity entirely, and unlike a shortfall in the amount in controversy, that defect cannot be cured by supplemental jurisdiction. I would plead citizenship on information and belief and seek early jurisdictional discovery if the filings stay opaque.
“Live in Providence, Rhode Island”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestIndividual citizenship. Domicile is physical presence plus intent to remain, measured at the moment of filing. Residence alone is not citizenship. Then complete diversity: no plaintiff may share citizenship with any defendant. Strawbridge v. Curtiss
What to writeBoth plaintiffs are probably Rhode Island citizens, and Mateo’s new Providence position supports intent to remain — but “live in” states residence, and I have just said residence is not citizenship. Confirm domicile for both rather than assume it. On that assumption, and against Nevada/Texas and Ohio/Illinois defendants, Strawbridge is satisfied.
“Third-degree burns… two surgeries… has not returned to work”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestAmount in controversy. § 1332(a) requires more than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The plaintiff’s good-faith demand controls unless it appears to a legal certainty that he cannot recover that much. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity v. Red Cab
What to writeMateo’s claim plainly exceeds the threshold: two surgeries, a three-week hospitalization, and lost earnings from a professional career. Nothing makes it legally certain he cannot reach $75,000.
“$1,890 each” and “$9,400 in damage”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestAggregation. A single plaintiff may add up all of her own claims against a single defendant. Separate plaintiffs may not aggregate with each other.
What to writeDolores may combine her $1,890 purchase and $9,400 in property damage, but $11,290 still falls well short, and she cannot borrow Mateo’s figure to get there.
Two plaintiffs, one of them under the thresholdSubject-matter jurisdiction
TestSupplemental jurisdiction. § 1367(a) reaches claims in the same Article III case; § 1367(b) withdraws some of them in diversity cases. Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah (2005) holds a co-plaintiff below the amount may remain so long as complete diversity is intact.
What to writeDolores rides along under § 1367. Her claim shares a common nucleus with Mateo’s — same purchase, same model, same alleged defect. Allapattah is the authority, and its limit is the point worth stating: § 1367 cures a shortfall in the amount, never a break in complete diversity.
“The United States charged Emberline under the federal… Act”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestFederal question. § 1331 needs a federal claim on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley A criminal statute rarely implies a private civil remedy. Alexander v. Sandoval (2001)
What to writeThe criminal charge gives the Amaros no federal claim of their own. A federal statute that appears only as evidence, or only in the defendant’s conduct, does not create § 1331 jurisdiction. I would not rely on federal question unless the Act itself authorizes private suit.
A state-law claim resting on the concealmentSubject-matter jurisdiction
TestEmbedded federal issue. Jurisdiction is available where a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and resolvable without disturbing the federal-state balance. Grable & Sons v. Darue (2005); Merrell Dow
What to writeIf a state consumer-protection count necessarily turns on the federal reporting duty, I would run the four Grable factors — while noting that Grable describes a narrow category, and that a claim which merely references a federal standard usually will not qualify.
“At least 240 overheating reports”Subject-matter jurisdiction
TestClass jurisdiction. CAFA, § 1332(d): minimal diversity, 100 or more class members, and more than $5,000,000 in the aggregate, exclusive of interest and costs. Then Rule 23(a) and a (b) category. Each is a separate showing — and the aggregate is the one that gets assumed.
What to writeDo the arithmetic before you claim the route. The 240 reports are incidents, not class members, and 240 × $1,890 is about $454,000 — more than $4.5 million short. What CAFA needs is the size of the purchaser class, which these facts never give: at $1,890 a unit it takes roughly 2,650 buyers to clear $5 million. So the reports are evidence going to Rule 23(a) numerosity and to what Emberline knew; the CAFA amount has to be built from sales volume, pleaded on information and belief and confirmed in discovery.
“At the HomeStack store in Seekonk, Massachusetts”Personal jurisdiction
TestSpecific jurisdiction, and the statute first. Rule 4(k)(1)(A) borrows the forum’s long-arm. In Massachusetts a specific subsection of G.L. c. 223A § 3 must be satisfied before the constitutional inquiry. SCVNGR v. Punchh (Mass. 2019)
What to writeMassachusetts is the clean forum for HomeStack: the sale, the pairing, and the app agreement all happened in its Massachusetts store. I would identify the c. 223A § 3 subsection first — SCVNGR forbids collapsing the statute into due process — and then run minimum contacts.
Purchase in one state, injury in anotherPersonal jurisdiction
TestRelatedness. Specific jurisdiction requires a claim that arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum contacts. No strict causal chain from an in-forum sale is required. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District (2021)
What to writeRhode Island jurisdiction does not fail merely because the kettle was bought in Massachusetts. Under Ford, a defendant that systematically serves the Rhode Island market for this product may be sued there by a Rhode Island resident injured there — but Ford still requires forum contacts for the claim to relate to.
Nothing says whether Emberline sells into Rhode IslandPersonal jurisdictionSilence
TestPurposeful availment, and the unilateral act. A plaintiff’s own conduct in carrying a product into the forum cannot create jurisdiction over the seller. World-Wide Volkswagen; Walden v. Fiore (2014)
What to writeArgue both ways, and say which way you would bet. If Emberline advertises and ships into Rhode Island, Ford carries specific jurisdiction there. If the only Rhode Island connection is that a buyer drove the kettle home from Massachusetts, that is the plaintiff’s unilateral act and the claim belongs in Massachusetts.
“Sells… worldwide through its own site”Personal jurisdiction
TestStream of commerce and internet contacts. Whether placing goods in the stream suffices, or whether additional conduct targeting the forum is required, remains unsettled. World-Wide Volkswagen; Asahi; J. McIntyre v. Nicastro
What to writeDirect online sales plus a nationwide retail channel is strong evidence of purposeful availment, but Asahi split and McIntyre produced no majority. I would plead targeting facts — state-specific shipping, advertising, warranty service — rather than resting on the existence of a website.
“Stores in thirty states,” “worldwide”Personal jurisdiction
TestGeneral jurisdiction. A corporation is subject to all-purpose jurisdiction only where it is at home — ordinarily incorporation and principal place of business. Substantial in-state business is not enough. Goodyear (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014)
What to writeNeither defendant is at home in Rhode Island or Massachusetts. Daimler rejects the argument that doing a lot of business in a state makes a company at home there, so everything here runs through specific jurisdiction.
Registration to do business in the forumPersonal jurisdiction
TestConsent by registration. A state may condition registration on consent to general jurisdiction if its statute says so expressly. Mallory v. Norfolk Southern (2023)
What to writeWorth a sentence, not a paragraph. Mallory turns entirely on the wording of the particular registration statute, and most do not expressly extract consent — so I would check the text before building anything on it.
“Tapped through the setup agreement… Neither Amaro read it”Personal jurisdictionBuried
TestClickwrap terms. A forum-selection clause is enforced under § 1404(a) with the clause controlling and the plaintiff’s choice given no weight; an arbitration clause may remove the dispute from court entirely. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute; Atlantic Marine (2013); FAA
What to writeThis is the buried trigger, and it sits above everything else. Before choosing a forum I would obtain both agreements. Atlantic Marine means a valid clause effectively decides venue, and an arbitration clause could moot the entire filing analysis — so it is the first document I ask for, not the last.
Sale in Massachusetts, fire and injury in Rhode IslandVenue, transfer, removal
TestVenue. § 1391(b)(2): a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions occurred. § 1391(c)(2): an entity resides wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction for this case.
What to writeVenue lies in the District of Massachusetts on the sale and pairing, and in the District of Rhode Island on the fire and the injury. Section 1391(b)(2) does not ask where most events happened, only whether a substantial part happened there, so both are proper and the choice is strategic.
Choosing between two proper districtsVenue, transfer, removal
TestTransfer usually carries the law with it — with one exception. On an ordinary § 1404(a) convenience transfer, the transferee court applies the transferor forum’s choice-of-law rules. Van Dusen v. Barrack; Ferens v. John Deere Where the transfer instead enforces a valid forum-selection clause, those rules do not travel. Atlantic Marine (2013)
What to writeAn ordinary convenience transfer does not let a defendant shed the conflicts rules of the district the plaintiff chose, so the filing decision usually survives a move. The exception is live here: if the setup agreement carries a valid forum-selection clause, Atlantic Marine removes that protection and the transferee’s own conflicts rules apply. One more reason the agreement gets read before anything is filed.
If the case is filed in state courtVenue, transfer, removal
TestRemoval. § 1441; the forum-defendant rule in § 1441(b)(2) bars diversity removal only where a properly joined and served defendant is a citizen of the forum state; unanimity under § 1446(b)(2)(A); 30 days; the one-year diversity limit in § 1446(c)(1).
What to writeThis rides on the LLC tracing above, so state it conditionally. If complete diversity is confirmed, no disclosed defendant is a citizen of Rhode Island or Massachusetts, the forum-defendant rule blocks nothing, and the defendants may remove from either state’s courts if the remaining requirements are met. Removal is their option to exercise, not something that happens on its own — but I would plan for federal court rather than be moved there.
“Just passed the architect registration examination”Parties and joinder
TestWho owns the claim. Rule 17(a) real party in interest; Rule 17(b) capacity. An adult sues in his own name, and a parent has no claim for an adult child’s injuries absent a recognized derivative action.
What to writeThe detail establishes that Mateo is an adult: he must sue in his own name, and Dolores cannot recover for his burns. She needs her own claim — her purchase and her property damage. Whether the forum recognizes loss of consortium for an adult child is state-specific and usually the answer is no.
Two plaintiffs, one purchase, one alleged defectParties and joinder
TestJoinder of plaintiffs. Rule 20(a)(1): a right to relief arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series, plus a common question. Rule 18 then lets each plaintiff add any other claim she has.
What to writeJoinder is proper: the same trip, the same model, and the same alleged defect, with common questions of design and of what Emberline knew.
A manufacturer and a retailer, one saleParties and joinder
TestJoinder of defendants and the claims among them. Rule 20(a)(2); Rule 13(g) crossclaims for indemnity or contribution; Rule 14 impleader, which requires derivative liability rather than an assertion that someone else is really at fault.
What to writeBoth defendants may be joined, and expect a Rule 13(g) indemnity crossclaim between retailer and manufacturer. The facts name no component supplier, so do not invent one — the conditional is the answer. If discovery identifies a supplier that may owe Emberline indemnity or contribution, Rule 14 becomes available; and note that “the supplier caused it” is not impleader unless the supplier owes Emberline what Emberline owes the Amaros.
Class members whose kettles never failedParties and joinder
TestStanding across the class. Every plaintiff seeking damages must have a concrete injury; a bare statutory violation is not automatically one. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021) Commonality needs a contention capable of classwide resolution. Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011)
What to writeAn owner whose kettle worked has no physical injury, so the class theory must be economic — that the price paid reflected a safety representation that was false. I would define the class around overpayment rather than around the reporting violation, because TransUnion requires concrete harm for every damages class member.
“Trial is expected before the end of the year”The parallel criminal case
TestOffensive nonmutual issue preclusion. The issue must be identical, actually litigated, determined, and necessary to the judgment; the court retains discretion, including where the plaintiff could easily have joined earlier or where application would be unfair. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore (1979)
What to writeA conviction would preclude Emberline on the narrow fact actually decided — that it received reports and failed to report them in time — and that finding came under a higher standard of proof, which strengthens the case for preclusion. It would not establish defect or causation, because the criminal case decides neither. Claim the narrow ground and say plainly what it does not reach.
A pending criminal case alongside civil discoveryThe parallel criminal case
TestStay and privilege. A corporation has no privilege against self-incrimination. Braswell v. United States (1988) Individual employees do, which is the real engine of a stay motion.
What to writeEmberline itself cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment, so a blanket stay is not justified by the company’s exposure. Its employees can, so I would oppose a full stay and propose a narrow one limited to the individual witnesses while document discovery proceeds.
Waiting for the conviction versus filing nowThe parallel criminal case
TestLimitations. The statute of limitations does not pause for a parallel criminal case.
What to writeFile now. Waiting for a judgment to use offensively risks the limitations period, while a stay preserves the same benefit without the risk — the preclusion argument remains available whenever the criminal judgment lands.
Rhode Island law versus Massachusetts law on the same defectErie and choice of law
TestWhich state’s law. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the forum state’s choice-of-law rules. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins; Klaxon v. Stentor Massachusetts channels product claims largely through the UCC implied warranty of merchantability; Rhode Island recognizes strict products liability.
What to writeSay it in two steps, because collapsing them is the error. The forum supplies its own choice-of-law rules; those rules then select the governing substantive law — and the two districts could perfectly well land on the same state’s law. Where they do not, the difference is real, since a strict-liability framing and a warranty framing put different elements in issue. So run each forum’s conflicts analysis rather than assuming a federal court applies the law of the state it sits in.
A state provision colliding with a Federal RuleErie and choice of law
TestThe Hanna track. If a valid Federal Rule is on point it governs. Hanna v. Plumer; Shady Grove (2010) Only where none is on point do you reach outcome-determination, the twin aims, and countervailing federal interests.
What to writeIdentify the precise disputed issue first, then ask whether a Federal Rule directly addresses it. “Procedural” and “substantive” are labels that begin the analysis; they do not finish it.
“Hauled away with the debris before anyone inspected it”Preserving evidence
TestSpoliation of physical evidence. Two questions, in order. First, had a duty to preserve attached — was litigation pending or reasonably foreseeable when the thing was discarded? Only then is there a sanction question at all. Rule 37(e) governs electronically stored information only, so a physical object runs on the court’s inherent authority and forum law.
What to writeDo not concede spoliation. Dolores discarded the kettle the same week as the fire, before any claim existed, so the threshold question is whether litigation was reasonably foreseeable to her at that moment — and on these facts that is arguable, not settled. If the duty had attached, the exposure is an inherent-authority sanction under forum law rather than Rule 37(e), which does not reach a kettle. Either way I would disclose the loss early and build her claim on the surviving unit and the reports.
“Usage logs… remain on Emberline’s servers”Preserving evidence
TestESI preservation. Rule 37(e) applies once a duty to preserve attaches: curative measures on a showing of prejudice under (e)(1); the severe measures in (e)(2) require a finding of intent to deprive.
What to writeThe logs are electronically stored information, so Rule 37(e) governs them — but by its own terms only for information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, and Emberline’s duty is easy to establish with a prosecution already pending. I would send a preservation letter before filing. It proves nothing by itself; what it does is fix notice and scope, which is the baseline any later Rule 37(e) argument gets measured against.
“Recover for what happened”Pleading
TestPleading standard. Rule 8(a)(2) plus plausibility. Twombly; Iqbal Rule 9(g): special damages must be specifically stated.
What to writePlead the mechanism, not the conclusion: what overheated, what Emberline was told and when, and which 240 reports preceded this one. Lost earnings are special damages under Rule 9(g) and have to be stated specifically rather than folded into a general prayer.
Triggers arrive scattered through the facts. Answers do not get written in that order.
The cues above are specific to one pattern. These are the families they belong to — the phrasings that recur, and the test each one should start.
Fifteen cues, each with one best response. The wrong answers are the plausible ones: right result by the wrong route, the correct rule applied to the wrong entity, the test from the neighbouring doctrine.